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ABSTRACT
Delaware corporate law imposes a duty of loyalty on officers and directors as
a mechanism to regulate and deter self-dealing transactions. In nonprofit
corporations, however, there are generally no shareholders with direct financial
incentives to monitor against self-dealing. In the absence of shareholders and
other principals, Congress and the IRS have articulated duty of loyalty rules for
nonprofits that reach far beyond those applied to the for-profit world—most
prominently the § 4958 intermediate sanctions. This article identifies the persons
who owe a duty of loyalty to a nonprofit corporation, the applicable fiduciary
standards for violating the duty of loyalty, and the remedies, procedures, and
exoneration provisions under these fiduciary rules. While § 4958 and Delaware
corporate law cover similar territory, they take remarkably different paths. By
comparing the Tax Code with Delaware corporate law, it is readily apparent that,
in the absence of shareholders, tax rules police the duty of loyalty for nonprofits
more strictly than Delaware corporate law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Delaware corporate law imposes a duty of loyalty on directors and officers as
a mechanism to regulate and deter self-dealing transactions. One important
method of monitoring for-profit companies for impermissible self-dealing
transactions is through shareholders, who may sue for violations of fiduciary duties
through derivative suits. 1 In public companies, shareholders can also exit through
the public markets, which imposes a form of discipline through the threat of a
hostile takeover. 2 Federal securities law also limits self-dealing, which includes
insider trading and “say on pay” proxy rules governing executive compensation.
In nonprofit corporations, however, there are generally no shareholders with direct
financial incentives to monitor against self-dealing. 3 Because nonprofits do not
have access to the shareholder mechanism to curtail unreasonable executive
compensation and other forms of self-dealing, 4 they rely instead on other state and
federal laws.
While state charitable trust law typically enforced by the state attorney
general is one mechanism of protection, 5 the federal government is the primary
enforcer of the duty of loyalty for tax-exempt corporations. Charitable
organizations may qualify for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal

* Nixon Peabody LLP
† Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law
1
See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management
of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 615 (1999) (“In the
corporate context, the shareholders are owners of the corporation and are protected by the fiduciary
standards imposed on the directors. If the directors breach their fiduciary duties, shareholders can
protect their interests by bringing a derivative action.”) (citation omitted).
2
Gary, supra note 1, at 615 (“If the shareholders do not approve of the way the directors run the
corporation, the shareholders can sell their stock or, theoretically at least, vote the directors out of
office.”) (citation omitted).
3
Id. at 596 n.23 (“One general rule is that members, unlike shareholders in business corporations,
can have no ownership interest in their corporation.”) (citation omitted). “If the nonprofit has voting
members, the members may have a legal right to represent the nonprofit by taking directors who
misbehave to court, but most nonprofits do not have voting members.” Id.; cf. Victor Brudney,
Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985);
see also Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIS.
L. REV. 227, 227–72, 235 (1999) (“Neither principals nor agents have an ownership interest in a
nonprofit; in a very real sense, nonprofits are unowned.”); Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of
Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 906 (2007)
(“The market-driven regime breaks down for nonprofit organizations on two fronts: First, there is no
market to keep the focus of individuals in control of nonprofits on a particular goal. Second, the goal of
nonprofit stakeholders – including donors, beneficiaries, and the larger public – are likely to be more
ephemeral and diverse than the common profit motive shared by the residual beneficiaries of businesses
. . . . Nonprofit governance is not bolstered by either a market for corporate control or derivative
litigation that focuses attention on the charitable mission.”).
4
Gary, supra note 1, at 615.
5
See Manne, supra note 3, at 250 (citations omitted); see also Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the
Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector Through a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 11–13 (2010). It is difficult for state attorneys general to regulate
nonprofits given limited staffing, underfunding and the highly political nature of the office. Manne,
supra note 3, at 251; Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law
Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 946–47 (2004); Helge, supra, at 27–29.
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Revenue Code (Tax Code). 6 One key requirement must be satisfied in order to
qualify for this special tax status: private individuals cannot inappropriately benefit
from transactions involving an exempt organization. 7 This issue often arises with
respect to executive compensation and prohibitions against self-dealing. 8
Traditionally, the penalty for this private benefit was the revocation of an entity’s
tax-exempt status. 9 This penalty was sometimes seen as too severe because it not
only punished the wrongdoer, but also penalized innocent parties that the charity
was designed to serve. 10 Revoking the tax-exempt status of a charitable
organization was seen as too severe of a penalty, so the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) asked for a less severe alternative, the “intermediate” sanction. Congress
responded by enacting the Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act 2 in 1996, adding § 4958 to
the Tax Code. 11 The transactions discussed during congressional hearings on this
new section included inappropriately large salaries, transfers from nonprofit to forprofit subsidiaries, non-interest bearing loans, and personal perks including
“luxury cars, servants, chauffeurs, country club memberships, and extremely
lucrative severance packages.” 12 A review of the tax returns of the 250 largest taxexempt organizations revealed that, of the top 2,000 executives, fifteen percent
were paid over $200,000 per year and thirty-eight individuals made over $400,000
per year. 13 Congress acknowledged that, “[a]t best, Federal and State enforcement
officers have been limited,” concluding that “[t]he Internal Revenue Service must
have the tools to deter and punish inurement and private benefit . . . .” 14 Rather
6

26 U.S.C.S. § 501(c)(3) (LexisNexis 2011).
Id. §§ 501(c)(3)-(4); see also Helge, supra note 5, at 17.
8
See Jack E. Karns, Justifying the Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption in a Competitive Market
Environment, 13 WIDENER L.J. 383, 425–26 (2004) (citing Michael A. Shea, New Intermediate
Sanctions Regulations for Executive and Consultant Compensation, 27 COLO. LAW. 51, 54 (1998)).
9
See id. at 425–26 (citing Shea, supra note 8, at 51).
10
Federal Tax Laws Applicable to the Activities of Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong. 39
(1993); see also Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 736 (2007) (“[A]n intermediate sanction which allows the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) to discipline a charitable organization without revoking its tax-exempt status if the
organization crosses over into an inurement situation but still generally operates for the benefit of the
public.”).
11
Karns, supra note 8, at 425 (citation omitted); see generally BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 569 (John Wiley & Sons 2007); Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of
Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575 (2000);
Kertz, infra note 15; James R. King & David S. Boyce, Revocation of Tax-Exempt Status, Excise Taxes,
and Other Intermediate Sanctions Issues, Plus Income Taxes: How the Rules Have Changed After
Caracci v. Commissioner, 36 J. HEALTH L. 1 (Winder 2003); Manny, supra note 10; D. Alexander
Ritchie, Intermediate Sanctions: Controlling the Tax-Exempt Organization Manager, 18 VA. TAX REV.
875 (1999); Allison M. Sawyer, Intermediate Sanctions: Protection for Charitable Organizations and
the Donations They Receive, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 125 (2003); Shea, supra note 8; Symposium,
The Push and Pull of Tax Exemption Law on the Organization and Delivery of Health Care Services:
Executive Compensation in Nonprofit Health Care Organizations: Who’s In Charge?, 15 HEALTH
MATRIX 67 (2005); J. Eric Taylor, Intermediate Sanctions Under § 4958: An Overview of the Proposed
Regulations, 73 FLA. B.J. 73 (1999).
12
Federal Tax Laws Applicable to the Activities of Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong. 39
(1993).
13
Id.
14
Unofficial Transcript of Ways and Means Oversight Hearing on Activities of Public Charities at
7
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than face the “uncomfortable choice: either to revoke an organization’s exemption
and cause untold havoc, or to walk away and do nothing,” § 4958 provides a
structure of intermediate sanctions. 15
In the absence of shareholders or other principals to monitor and prevent
self-dealing, 16 Congress and the IRS have articulated duty of loyalty rules for
nonprofits far beyond those applied to the for-profit world. 17 Intermediate
sanctions, in particular, know no real analogue in Delaware corporate law, as they
seek to impose liability directly on the insiders, with few procedural hurdles.
Intermediate sanctions are the hidden tiger of United States corporate fiduciary
law, at least for the tax-exempt sector. When agents control assets without the
watchful oversight of principals such as shareholders, perhaps an enhanced duty of
loyalty regime is entirely appropriate.
This article first identifies the persons who owe a duty of loyalty to the
corporation. In Delaware law, we focus on the directors. Under intermediate
sanctions, the federal tax law widens the scope to include individuals with
functional authority to make decisions, which include both the board as well as
certain organizational managers. The third section articulates the applicable
fiduciary standards for violations of the duty of loyalty. This time, Delaware takes
the broader approach, sweeping in many additional categories beyond the narrowly
prescribed categories under federal tax law. In the fourth section, we examine the
remedies, procedural rules, and exoneration provisions under these two sets of
fiduciary rules. As we will see, Delaware and the IRS cover similar territory with
respect to the fiduciary duty of loyalty, but take remarkably different paths.
II. WHO OWES A DUTY OF LOYALTY TO THE CORPORATION?
Under federal tax law, the intermediate sanctions version of the duty of
loyalty is owed by “disqualified persons” and “organizational managers.” 18
Intermediate sanctions personally penalize individuals, in addition to the
organization, for participating in “excess benefit transactions.” 19 These categories
are different from Delaware law, which generally focuses on the directors and

3, 93 TNT 164-29 (June 21, 1993).
15
Consuelo Lauda Kertz, Executive Compensation Dilemmas in Tax-Exempt Organizations:
Reasonableness, Comparability, and Disclosure, 71 TUL. L. REV. 819, 822.
16
See e.g., Manne, supra note 3, at 228 (“There is no market for corporate control; there are no
proxy battles, no shareholder derivative suits, and there is very little market competition.”) (citation
omitted).
17
Id. at 237 (“Because private monitoring is so costly in nonprofits, strong fiduciary rules provide
a relatively inexpensive deterrence system, but one which, in theory accomplishes the same end as more
expensive monitoring: ‘[b]y imposing personal liability on corporate officers and directors for breach of
the duties of care (negligence) and loyalty (conflict of interest), litigation is thought to align managers’
incentives with shareholder interests.’”) (citing Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation
Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 55 (1991)); see also Ritchie, supra note 11, at 903
(“The modern trend is to apply corporate law standards on the rationale that the duties of exempt
organization directors and managers are similar, if not identical, to those in for-profit corporations.”).
18
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200435019 (May 5, 2004); see also Karns, supra note 8, at 425 (citation
omitted).
19
Karns, supra note 8, at 426 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4958(c) (2000), 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(a)
(2011)).
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officers of the corporation.
A. Disqualified Person
A “disqualified person,” as defined under § 4958 is “any person . . . in a
position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization [at
issue].” 20 A person is disqualified as long as they possessed this authority “at any
time during the 5-year period ending on the date of such transaction.” 21 Even the
family member of a person satisfying this definition may be considered a
disqualified person. 22 Family members include spouses, siblings, spouses of
siblings, ancestors, children, grandchildren, great grandchildren, and spouses of
children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren. 23 For example, the president and
director of a nonprofit organization was found to be a disqualified person in a
transaction involving his son, also a director, who was living rent free for six
months in the organization’s investment property. 24 His disqualified person status
was a result of his familial relationship with his son, who was in a position that
afforded the opportunity to “exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the
organization.” 25 The definition of a disqualified person also includes a “35percent controlled entity.” 26 The regulations explain that a 35-percent controlled
entity results from a person owning voting power exceeding 35 percent in a
corporation, 27 profit interests over 35 percent in a partnership, 28 or if a trust or
estate owns a beneficial interest exceeding 35 percent. 29
B. Substantial Influence
To satisfy the definition of a disqualified person, any of the aforementioned
categories of individuals must be “in a position to exercise substantial influence
over the affairs of the organization.” 30 This requirement is automatically satisfied
by (1) “voting members of the governing body,” 31 (2) “[p]residents, chief
executive officers, or chief operating officers,” 32 (3) “[t]reasurers and chief

20

26 U.S.C.S. § 4958(f)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2011).
Id.
22
Id. § 4958(f)(1)(B).
23
26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(b)(1) (2011) (the relationship between the disinterested person and
siblings or spouses of siblings may be “by whole or half blood”).
24
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200435020 (May 5, 2004).
25
Id.
26
26 U.S.C.S. § 4958(f)(1)(C) (LexisNexis 2011).
27
26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(b)(2)(i)(A)–(ii) (2011) (combined voting power includes voting power
represented by holdings of voting stock, direct or indirect, but does not include voting rights held only
as a director, trustee, or other fiduciary).
28
Id. § 53.4958-3(b)(2)(i)(B).
29
Id. § 53.4958-3(b)(2)(i)(C).
30
26 U.S.C.S. § 4958(f)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2011).
31
26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(c)(1) (2011) (“This category includes any individual serving on the
governing body of the organization who is entitled to vote on any matter over which the governing body
has authority.”).
32
Id. § 53.4958-3(c)(2) (“This category includes any person who, regardless of title, has ultimate
21
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financial officers,” 33 and (4) “[p]ersons with a material financial interest in a
provider-sponsored organization.” 34
Under § 501(c)(3), tax-exempt organizations themselves are “deemed not to
be in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of an[other]
applicable tax-exempt organization.” 35 Furthermore, neither full nor part-time
employees are considered to exercise substantial influence over an organization if
they “receiv[e] economic benefits, directly or indirectly from the organization, of
less than the amount referenced for a highly compensated employee” or are “not a
substantial contributor to the organization.” 36 The employee, however, still cannot
be related to a disqualified person, have a 35 percent interest, or fall into any of the
specifically articulated categories of individuals with substantial influence. 37
According to a private letter ruling, the IRS classified an individual as a
disqualified person, not based on her consulting agreement with the nonprofit
organization, but based on the fact that her husband was the organization’s
president and chief executive officer immediately prior to the execution of her
consulting agreement. 38 Her duties under the consulting agreement included
representing the company at meetings and events as well as participating in
fundraising activities, and consulting with management and the organization’s
board of directors, 39 none of which alone would likely render her a disqualified
person.
If an individual does not fall into one the aforementioned categories, his or
her status is dependent on the “relevant facts and circumstances.” 40 The
regulations specify certain facts and circumstances that indicate when a person is
likely to have substantial influence. 41 For example, substantial influence is
indicated if an individual founded the organization, makes substantial contributions

responsibility for implementing the decisions of the governing body or for supervising the management,
administration, or operation of the organization. A person who serves as president, chief executive
officer, or chief operating officer has this ultimate responsibility unless the person demonstrates
otherwise. If this ultimate responsibility resides with two or more individuals (e.g., co-presidents), who
may exercise such responsibility in concert or individually, then each individual is in a position to
exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization.”).
33
Id. § 53.4958-3(c)(3) (“This category includes any person who, regardless of title, has ultimate
responsibility for managing the finances of the organization. A person who serves as treasurer or chief
financial officer has this ultimate responsibility unless the person demonstrates otherwise. If this
ultimate responsibility resides with two or more individuals who may exercise the responsibility in
concert or individually, then each individual is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the
affairs of the organization.”).
34
Id. § 53.4958-3(c)(4) (“For purposes of section 4958, if a hospital that participates in a providersponsored organization (as defined in section 1855(e) of the Social Security Act) is an applicable taxexempt organization, then any person with a material financial interest (within the meaning of section
501(o)) in the provider-sponsored organization has substantial influence with respect to the hospital.”).
35
Id. § 53.4958-3(d).
36
Id. § 53.4958-3(d)(3)(i), (iii).
37
Id. § 53.4958-3(d)(3)(ii).
38
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 200244028 (June 21, 2002).
39
Id.
40
26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(e)(1) (2011).
41
Id. § 53.4958-3(e)(2).
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to the organization, or owns a controlling interest in the organization at issue. 42 A
person can also likely exert substantial influence over an organization if their
“compensation is primarily based on revenues derived from activities of the
organization, or of a particular department or function of the organization, that the
person controls” or if “[t]he person has or shares authority to control or determine
a substantial portion of the organization’s capital expenditures, operating budget,
or compensation for employees.” 43 Substantial influence will also likely result if
the person manages “a substantial portion of the activities, assets, income, or
expenses of the organization” or “[t]he person is a non-stock organization
controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more disqualified persons.” 44
Individuals who commonly do not have substantial influence over an organization
are contractors, such as attorneys, accountants, or investment managers, who only
provide professional advice about transactions and receive no economic benefit
except traditional service fees. 45 By the same logic, individuals that have no
control over management decisions affecting a “substantial portion of the
activities, assets, income, or expenses of the organization” are unlikely to have
substantial influence. 46 Other factors that tend to disprove substantial influence
include: a person who took a vow of poverty as a member of a religious
organization; an individual whose supervisor is not a disqualified person; or if
“[a]ny preferential treatment a person receives based on the size of that person’s
contribution is also offered to all other donors making a comparable contribution
as part of a solicitation intended to attract a substantial number of contributions.” 47
C. Organizational Manager
In addition to “disqualified persons,” § 4958 also specifically targets
“organizational managers.” 48 Organizational managers are any “officer, director
or trustee” of a tax-exempt organization. 49 According to the regulations, a person
is deemed an officer of an organization for purposes of § 4958 if they are
“specifically so designated under the certificate of incorporation, by-laws, or other
constitutive documents of the organization” or “[r]egularly exercise general
authority to make administrative or policy decisions on behalf of the
organization.” 50 The authority to recommend certain administrative or policy
decisions without the power to implement them does not make an individual an
officer. 51 Further, outside contractors acting as a tax-exempt organization’s
attorney, accountant, investment manager or advisor are not considered managerial
42

Id.
Id. § 53.4958-3(e)(2)(iii)–(iv).
44
Id. § 53.4958-3(e)(2)(v), (vii).
45
Id. § 53.4958-3(e)(3).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
26 U.S.C.S. § 4958(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011).
49
Id. § 4958(f)(2). This includes individuals with responsibilities similar to individuals acting as
an “officer, director or trustee,” irrespective of their actual job title. Id.
50
26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-1(d)(2)(i)(A)–(B) (2011).
51
Id. § 53.4958-1(d)(2)(i)(B).
43
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officers under the regulations. 52
D. Delaware Corporate Law
Unlike federal tax law, the Delaware corporate duty of loyalty is focused
almost exclusively on directors and officers. 53 The Delaware Supreme Court
explained that a person is interested if they “appear on both sides of a transaction
[]or expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of selfdealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all
stockholders generally.” 54 In other words, corporate officers and directors are
prohibited from using “their position of trust and confidence to further their private
interests.” 55 This prohibition is a result of their fiduciary relationship to both the
stockholders of the corporation and the corporation itself. 56
Delaware courts also explain what interests do and do not result in an
“interested person.” Board members are not automatically an interested person
based on the receipt of a salary, 57 a large stockholding, 58 or if they are
indemnified. 59 In Cooke v. Oolie, the court explained that if directors select a
transaction that protects their personal interests as creditors over other proposals in
the best interests of the company’s shareholders, they are interested because they
would be deriving a financial benefit. 60 Courts are also concerned about the
motivations of directors when handling takeovers that threaten their control. 61
When comparing the Tax Code with Delaware corporate law, it is clear

52

Id.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2010) (“No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1
or more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership,
association, or other organization in which 1 or more of its directors or officers, are directors or officers,
or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the
director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes
the contract or transaction, or solely because any such director’s or officer’s votes are counted for such
purpose . . . .”).
54
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
55
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see also Valeant Pharmals. Int’l v. Jenery, 921
A.2d 732, 735 (Del. Ch. 2007) (involving a compensation committee comprised of interested members
who were evaluating a transaction where they each would receive large cash bonuses).
56
Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
57
Growbot v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188 (Del. 1988) (“The only averment permitting such an
inference is the allegation that all GM’s directors are paid for their services as directors. However, such
allegations, without more, do not establish any financial interest.”).
58
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985).
59
Grover v. Simmons (In re Sea-Land Corp. S’holders Litig), 642 A.2d 792, 804 (Del. Ch. 1993)
(“Normally, the receipt of indemnification is not deemed to taint related director actions with a
presumption of self-interest . . . because indemnification has become commonplace in corporate affairs
and because indemnification does not increase a director’s wealth.”) (citation omitted).
60
Cooke v. Oolie, No. 11134, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89, at *40 (2000) (The court applied the
rationale of section 144 even though the facts did not fall within the parameters of the statute. The
court explained, “the defendants’ creditor status provided motivation for them to pursue an acquisition
proposal that best protected their personal loans to TNN . . . . Their fiduciary duties compelled them to
seek the best deal possible for the shareholders, but their creditor status created the incentive to protect
their personal loans despite the shareholders’ interests.”).
61
Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964) (citing Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del.
1962); Yasik v. Wachtel, 17 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1941)).
53
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Delaware has a bright line rule that imposes the fiduciary duty of loyalty on
directors and officers, while federal tax law extends beyond the scope of directors
and officers through the application of flexible categories such as disqualified
persons, persons with substantial influence, and organizational managers. Like the
Tax Code, Delaware corporate law still takes into account the personal interests
and level of control directors and officers exert, but generally during the
subsequent step of determining whether fiduciary duties have been violated. 62
III. HAS THE DUTY OF LOYALTY BEEN VIOLATED?
Disqualified individuals will be subject to § 4958 tax penalties if they engage
in an “excess benefit transaction.” 63 The Internal Revenue Code defines “excess
benefit transaction” as:
[A]ny transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable taxexempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified
person if the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the
consideration (including the performance of services) received for providing such
benefit. 64

When evaluating whether an excess benefit transaction occurred, “all consideration
and benefits . . . are taken into account.” 65 The economic benefit can be direct or
indirect. 66 For example, a benefit issued “indirectly through the use of one or
more entities [the tax-exempt organization] controls” is still an excess benefit
transaction. 67 Methods of control include “ownership of more than 50 percent of
the stock[,] . . . profits[, capital] interest[, or] . . . beneficial interest” in a
corporation, partnership or other entity as well as if “at least 50 percent of the
directors or trustees of [a nonstock] organization are either representatives of, or
directly or indirectly controlled by, an applicable tax-exempt organization.”68
Essentially, this provision translates to mean that § 4958 tax penalties will be
imposed when transactions would be considered private inurement or private
benefit. 69 Excess-benefit transactions may include “excessive rental payments,
purchase of assets for more than fair market value, and nonmarket rate loans.” 70
This article will briefly explore a common transaction: executive compensation.

62
In US corporate law, any disloyal agent could be liable to the corporate principal for violation of
fiduciary duties, but in the context of derivative litigation by shareholders, the targets are almost always
limited to directors and officers, partially due to the demand requirements for derivative litigation: it is
difficult to prove demand futility unless the board itself is amongst the accused.
63
26 U.S.C.S. § 4958(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2011).
64
Id § 4958(c)(1)(A); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(a)(1) (2011).
65
26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(a)(1) (2011).
66
Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(2)(i).
67
Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(2)(ii)(A).
68
Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(2)(ii)(B).
69
Kertz, supra note 15, at 832.
70
26 U.S.C.S. § 501(c)(3)–(4) (LexisNexis 2011).
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A. Benefits Involved in a Compensation Analysis
According to § 4958, compensation “includes all economic benefits provided
by an applicable tax-exempt organization in exchange for the performance of
services.” 71 These benefits account for both cash and non-cash compensation,
including salary, fees, bonuses and severance payments. 72 Benefits also include
the payment of liability insurance premiums or the payment or reimbursement of
“[a]ny penalty, tax, or expense of correction owed,” 73 unreasonable litigation
expenses, 74 and any other welfare benefit plans. 75
An economic benefit, however, is only deemed consideration if the provider
of the benefit “clearly indicates its intent to treat the benefit as compensation when
[it] . . . is paid.” 76 This intent is only demonstrated if “the organization provides
written substantiation that is contemporaneous with the transfer of the economic
benefit at issue.” 77 A transfer approved by an appropriate decision-making body
or authorized officer for compensation consistent with the standard procedures of
the organization can also be considered compensation for services. 78 This
requirement makes it extremely difficult to claim ex post that an excess benefit
transaction was actually compensation in an attempt to avoid tax penalties. It
increases transparency, ex ante identification, and subsequently decreases the
opportunity for fraud. Examples of written evidence include the nonprofit
organization issuing a Form W-2 “Wage and Tax Statement,” a Form 1099
“Miscellaneous Income” statement, or if the recipient of the benefit includes it as
income on a federal tax return. 79 Another example of written evidence would be
Lastly, a Form 990 could
an approved written employment contract. 80
demonstrate whether or not a benefit received was compensation. Certain taxexempt organizations are required to file a Form 990, which includes a list of
expenses and the compensation paid to specific individuals within the
organization. 81 In one private letter ruling, the son-in-law of the founder and
President of a nonprofit organization was found to be a disqualified person
engaging in an excess benefit transaction because he had exclusive use of the
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26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2011).
Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B)(1).
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Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B)(2)(i).
74
Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B)(2)(ii)–(iii).
75
Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B)(3) (stating welfare benefit plans include “plans providing medical,
dental, life insurance, severance pay, and disability benefits, and both taxable and nontaxable fringe
benefits . . . .”).
76
Id. § 53.4958-4(c)(1).
77
Id. § 53.4958-4(c)(1)–(2) (“[A]n applicable tax-exempt organization is not required to indicate
its intent to provide an economic benefit as compensation for services if the economic benefit is
excluded from the disqualified person’s gross income for income tax purposes . . . . Examples of these
benefits include, but are not limited to, employer-provided health benefits and contributions to a
qualified pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan under section 401(a) . . . .”).
78
Id. § 53.4958-4(c)(3)(i)(B)(ii).
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Id. § 53.4958-4(c)(3)(i)(A)(1)–(2).
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Id. § 53.4958-4(c)(3)(i)(B)(ii)(A).
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General Instructions: Overview of Form 990, IRS, available at http://www.irs.gov/instructions/
i990/ch01.html#d0e756 (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
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company’s truck. 82 Though it was claimed that the son-in-law was managing a
property owned by the organization, there was no documentation demonstrating
when his employment began, what his responsibilities entailed, or any record of
the business purposes the truck was used for. 83
As this private letter ruling demonstrates, without the proper ex ante written
evidence, any transaction that confers a benefit on a disqualified person will not be
deemed consideration for services rendered. 84 Instead, it will be considered an
automatic excess benefit transaction. 85 The reasonableness of the benefit is
irrelevant. 86 This requirement penalizes people in order to increase compliance
with the statute. Therefore, undocumented expenses will likely be treated as
automatic excess benefit transactions under § 4958. 87 In one private letter ruling,
payments for an officer’s automobile, life insurance, consulting fee, and charges
for travel and entertainment were all considered undocumented expenses and
therefore, automatic excess benefit transactions. 88 In another private letter ruling,
the tax-exempt status of an organization was revoked. 89 The organization’s
purpose was to “educate the public and policymakers about issues regarding hemp
and motto and provide legal charitable services to certain medical patients.” 90 One
of the bases for this revocation was that the founder and President of the
organization used the net earnings of the marijuana clinic for his own private
inurement. 91 Although the board of directors, consisting of the president, the
president’s mother, and two other directors, approved the president’s compensation
package annually, 92 there was almost no documentation. 93 According to the
minutes, which were identical every year, the president was expected to “raise and
spend up to $*** in the next calendar year” and “pay his own expenses including
rent, utilities and other costs.” 94 The president used the organization’s funds, over
which he had complete control, to “pa[y] house rent and utilities . . . along with car
payments, insurance, and personal living and travel expenses.” 95 In other cases,
examples of benefits deemed to be excess benefit transactions include the use of a
82

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200435018 (May 5, 2004).
Id.
84
26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(c)(1) (2011).
85
HOPKINS, supra note 11, at 616.
86
Id.
87
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201013061 (Dec. 9, 2009).
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Id.
89
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201013062 (Jan. 6, 2010). The organization included on its Form 1023 that
it intended:
To provide a charitable service to medical patients who have medical cards
permitting them to grow motto to alleviate their symptoms or condition. ORG
will assist in the production of motto by those patients who are legally entitled to
grow motto but are too poor or disabled to do so.
Id.
90
Id.
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Id. We are tempted to label this activity “self-dealing.”
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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company cellular phone, computer, no-interest loans, and payment for a spouse’s
travel. 96
Alternatively, certain economic benefits are excluded from a compensation
analysis. These include payment for reasonable expenses incurred by members of
the organization’s governing body to attend board meetings, and benefits conferred
on a disqualified person “solely as a member of or volunteer of the organization”
or “as a member of a charitable class.” 97 The reasonableness component of
compensation also excludes de minimis fringe benefits under § 132. 98 De minimis
fringe benefits are “any property or service the value of which is so small as to
make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracticable.” 99
Further, a § 4958 compensation analysis does not include “fixed payments
made pursuant to an initial contract.” 100 A fixed payment is “an amount of cash or
other property specified in the contract, or determined by a fixed formula specified
in the contract, which is to be paid or transferred in exchange for the provision of
specified services . . . .” 101 A fixed formula can incorporate a future event so long
as the benefit is not subject to personal discretion. 102 An initial contract is “a
binding written contract between an applicable tax-exempt organization and a
person who was not a disqualified person . . . immediately prior to entering into the
contract.” 103 The person is not a disqualified person when an initial contract is
executed because they do not yet work for the organization. If a contract contains
both a fixed and non-fixed payment, the fixed payment portion of the initial
contract will be excluded from the § 4958 compensation analysis and the non-fixed
payment may be considered an excess benefit. 104
B. Reasonableness of Compensation
Compensation will be considered reasonable if “the value of services is the
amount that would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like
circumstances.” 105 The circumstances considered are usually those that “exist[ed]
at the date when the contract for services was made.” 106 This standard is distinct
from the private inurement reasonableness standard which, according to the United
States Tax Court, may consider “circumstances occurring after the transaction in
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HOPKINS, supra note 11, at 616 (citing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200435018 (May 5, 2004)).
Id. at 615 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(a)(4) (2011)).
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I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200822039 (Feb. 21, 2008).
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26 U.S.C.S. § 132(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2011).
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26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(i) (2011).
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Id. § 53.4958-4(3)(ii)(A).
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Id. (“A specified event or contingency may include the amount of revenues generated by (or
other objective measure of) one or more activities of the applicable tax-exempt organization. A fixed
payment does not include any amount paid to a person under a reimbursement (or similar) arrangement
where discretion is exercised by any person with respect to the amount of expenses incurred or
reimbursed.”).
103
Id. § 53.4958-4(3)(iii).
104
Id. § 53.4958-4(3)(vi).
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Id. § 53.4958-4 (b)(1)(ii).
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Hopkins, supra note 11, at 613.
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question . . . .” 107 Factors such as a salary cap are one of several used to determine
the reasonableness of a compensation package. 108
C. Rebuttable Presumption of Reasonableness
A key feature of intermediate sanctions as described in § 4958 is the
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. According to the tax regulations, a
compensation arrangement is presumed reasonable if three provisions are
satisfied. 109 Nonprofits can rely on these provisions to avoid tax penalties and
potential loss of their tax-exempt status. Failure to satisfy these provisions,
however, does not result in an “inference that the transaction is an excess benefit
transaction.” 110 This provision is similar to the Delaware “safe harbor” statute
discussed below.
First, a disinterested authorized body of the organization must approve the
compensation arrangement. 111 An authorized body is simply a governing body of
the tax-exempt organization, including a board of directors or board of trustees. 112
These individuals on the authorized body may not have a conflict of interest with
respect to the proposed compensation arrangement. 113 This requires that they are
not “a disqualified person participating in or economically benefiting from the
compensation arrangement or . . . a member of the family of any such disqualified
person.” 114 The authorized body also may not have an employment relationship
“subject to the direction or control” of the disqualified person benefiting from the
compensation arrangement, 115 or receive their own compensation pending the
approval from the disqualified person benefitting from the arrangement. 116
Members of the authorized body also may not have a material financial interest
impacted by the arrangement, 117 nor can the benefiting party approve, in the past
or future, “a transaction providing economic benefits to the member.” 118 For
example, in In re InfoUSA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation the Delaware court found
that six members of the board of directors had self-interests that “would prevent
them from considering objectively a demand upon the board.” 119 One director was
receiving more money as compensation for his board membership than he was at
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Id. at 613 n.35 (citation omitted).
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200822039 (Feb. 21, 2008).
109
26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-6(a) (2011).
110
Id. § 53.4958-6.
111
Id. § 53.4958-6(a)(1).
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Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(i)(A). “[A]n individual is not included on the authorized body when it is
reviewing a transaction if that individual meets with other members only to answer questions, and
otherwise recuses himself or herself from the meeting and is not present during debate and voting on the
compensation arrangement or property transfer.” Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(ii).
113
Id. § 53.4958-6(a)(1).
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Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(A).
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Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(B).
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Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(C).
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Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(D).
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Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(E).
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In re InfoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 994 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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his professorship at Creighton University. 120 InfoUSA was also paying sizeable
legal fees to a firm in which another director was a named partner. 121 In addition,
two other directors were using free office space for their own businesses in
buildings owned by the director and CEO of InfoUSA, and later by InfoUSA
directly. 122
Second, similar to the Delaware standard, this authorized body must
“obtain[] and rel[y] upon appropriate data as to comparability prior to making its
determination.” 123 This data includes “compensation levels paid by similarly
situated organizations, . . . for functionally comparable positions,” “the availability
of similar services in the geographic area,” “current compensation surveys
compiled by independent firms,” and “actual written offers from similar
institutions competing for the services of the disqualified person.” 124
Third, the authorized body must “document[] the basis for its determination”
when it makes the determination. 125 This contemporaneous documentation
requirement demonstrates legislators’ skeptical view of justifications provided in
later litigation. It is not enough that a legislative body, agency, or court approved a
specific compensation package. 126 The documentation requirement involves a
written or electronic record that must include the terms of the agreement, the date
approved, the members of the authorized body present during any discussions, the
members who voted, the comparability data used, how the data was obtained, and
any “actions taken with respect to consideration of the transaction by anyone who
is otherwise a member of the authorized body but who had a conflict of interest
with respect to the transaction.” 127
It has been argued that if § 4958 had been in effect when the United Cancer
Council, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Affairs 128 opinion was rendered, the taxexempt organization could have relied on the “rebuttable presumption” doctrine. 129
In this case, a nonprofit organization conducting cancer research was in severe
financial trouble as a result of a large termination of dues-paying memberships. 130
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Id. at 992.
Id. at 991.
122
Id. at 992–93.
123
26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-6(a)(2) (2011).
124
Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i).
For organizations with annual gross receipts (including contributions) of less than
$ 1 million reviewing compensation arrangements, the authorized body will be
considered to have appropriate data as to comparability if it has data on
compensation paid by three comparable organizations in the same or similar
communities for similar services. No inference is intended with respect to
whether circumstances falling outside this safe harbor will meet the requirement
with respect to the collection of appropriate data.
Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(ii).
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Id. § 53.4958-6(a)(3).
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Id. § 53.4958-6(b)(1)(ii).
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Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(i).
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United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm’r, 109 T.C. 326 (1997), rev’d 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir.
1999).
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United Cancer Council hired a professional fundraiser and executed a contract that
compensated the fundraiser with a percentage of the net revenues they raised. 131
Under the agreement, if the proceeds did not cover the fundraising expenses,
United Cancer Council would not reimburse the fundraising company. 132
Ultimately, over six years $26.5 million was raised and paid to the professional
fundraiser for expenses and compensation. 133 Approximately $2.5 million was
paid to the nonprofit. 134 The Tax Court concluded that “imposing an excise tax on
‘excess benefit transactions’ applies only to transactions occurring on or after
September 14, 1995, and so does not apply to the instant case.” 135 The case was
later reversed and remanded by the Seventh Circuit to reevaluate the private
inurement and private benefit issues. 136 Had the transaction occurred after
September 14, 1995, it could have illustrated the benefit of § 4958 intermediate
sanctions as compared to revocation of an organization’s tax-exempt status based
on private inurement.
Intermediate sanctions under § 4958 were applied in Caracci v.
Commissioner, decided by the Tax Court in 2002, 137 and reversed by the Fifth
Circuit in 2006. 138 The case involved three privately owned home health care
agencies whose shareholders, directors, and officers were all employees and
members of the Carracci family. 139 The three agencies were all tax-exempt under
§ 501(c)(3) in order to comply with Medicare regulations at that time. 140 The
regulations were revised in the 1980s to permit taxable entities to participate in the
Medicare program. 141 In 1995, Medicare also changed its reimbursement policy
for home health care providers, paying “the lesser of the actual reasonable cost or
the customary charge, up to a maximum per-visit ‘cost cap.’” 142 This resulted in
Medicare reimbursing only expenses “deemed allowable,” rendering Medicare
home health care agencies whose business relied primarily on Medicare much less
profitable. 143 At this time, the Carracci’s agencies were providing over ninety-five
percent of their services to Medicare beneficiaries. 144 As a result of this difficult
reimbursement environment, by the end of 1995 the three agencies had assets and
liabilities equaling negative $1.4 million. 145 Under the advice of their attorney and
outside counsel, they considered turning their agencies into for-profit entities in
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Id. at 331–32.
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Caracci v. Comm’r, 456 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2006).
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order to become eligible for loans unavailable to tax-exempt entities. 146 The
agencies were converted from tax-exempt entities to taxable subchapter-S
corporations. 147 The Tax Court concluded that the assets transferred surpassed the
value of the liabilities and debts assumed by the subchapter-S corporations,
resulting in an “excess benefit.” 148 The Fifth Circuit overturned the Tax Courts
decision, insisting that improper valuation methods were used and that “the Tax
Court should have found in the taxpayers’ favor.” 149
Though § 4958 case law is quite limited, there are a few private letter rulings
on the subject. In one ruling, the chief executive officer of a nonprofit healthcare
organization and his wife were paid executive compensation as part of a postemployment consulting agreement. 150 The IRS determined that they were both
disqualified persons pursuant to § 4958. 151 The ruling addressed the application of
the rebuttable presumption doctrine concluding that: (1) the contract was approved
by a disinterested authorized body; (2) the contract had the proper supporting
documents; (3) the documents were provided by an outside executive
compensation consultant; and (4) the data was relied on to determine the
reasonableness of the agreement. 152 The private letter ruling, however, indicated
that the comparison did not occur “concurrent[ly] with the approval of the
consulting contract.” 153 By failing to satisfy this contemporaneous documentation
requirement the executive compensation agreement was subject to § 4958. 154
In summary, federal tax law exhibits a strong preference for ex ante evidence
of loyalty and a willingness for the courts to carefully examine the reasonableness
of potentially self-dealing transactions with insiders.
D. Delaware Corporate Law
Under Delaware law, it is more difficult to prove that a director or officer is
receiving excess pay because they provide “unique executive talent,” making it
difficult to calculate a “market price.” 155 In order to curtail risk-averse
management behavior, especially given the instability of current executive
management positions, compensation packages are increased in value to offset the
decreased job security in for-profit corporations today. 156
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Id. at 449 (“The primary form of conversion used was a transfer of assets from the old exempt
corporations to the newly formed nonexempt subchapter-S corporations, in exchange for assuming the
debts and liabilities of the exempt corporations.”).
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Caracci, 456 F.3d at 457–58.
150
I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200244028 (Jun. 21, 2002).
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN, & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 332 (3rd ed. 2009).
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Id.; see also Denise Ping Lee, The Business Judgment Rule: Should it Protect Nonprofit
Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 945–46 (2003).
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Executive compensation packages are further complicated by the fact that
compensation is determined by the board of directors, making it a “necessary form
of self-interested transaction.” 157 The board of directors is specifically given the
power to determine board member compensation. 158 Of course, directors cannot
participate in the vote to determine their own compensation. Boards typically have
compensation committees, with independent members, who make these decisions
for the inside directors. Corporations also have the power, under Delaware law, to
provide compensation for officers and agents of the corporation. 159 The general
rule is that directors, on behalf of the corporation, “have the sole authority to
determine compensation levels.” 160 Compensation packages may include a fixed
salary, 161 pensions, profit sharing agreements, stock options, stock bonuses,
retirement plans or benefit plans. 162 Executive compensation may also include
golden parachute payments to departing executives. 163
Though shareholders are often concerned with the level of executive
compensation as well as its procedures and form, it is difficult to object to these
packages because they are generally “protected by the presumption of the business
judgment rule.” 164 The concept behind the business judgment rule is that “courts
should not second-guess good-faith decisions made by independent and
disinterested directors.” 165 As glossed by the American Bar Association’s
Corporate Director’s Guidebook, “a decision constitutes a valid business judgment
(and gives no rise to liability for ensuing loss) when it (1) is made by financially
disinterested directors or officers (2) who have become duly informed before
exercising judgment and (3) who exercise judgment in a good-faith effort to
advance corporate interests.” 166 Federal tax law does not provide an equivalent
protection to interested persons under § 4958.
Delaware corporate law also affords the opportunity for executives to make
ex post arguments to justify their actions. In Broz v. Cellular Information Systems,
Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court explained that “the determination of whether or
not a director has appropriated for himself something that in fairness should belong
to the corporation is a factual question to be decided by reasonable inference from
objective facts.” 167 As a result of this approach, the director Robert Broz was able
to defend his decision not to present a corporate opportunity to the board of
Cellular Information Systems, Inc. on the grounds that the company was not in a
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ALLEN, supra note 155, at 330.
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position to undertake new acquisitions or debts. 168 The courts willingness to
accept post-hoc arguments allowed the director the opportunity to escape liability,
despite his failure to request formal board approval at the time. 169 When
comparing the IRS rule with Delaware’s business judgment rule it is clear that the
IRS rule is far more proscriptive.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also governs exchange-listed companies, adding
another federal layer of legal rules for executive compensation. 170 Similar to the
Internal Revenue Code, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires exchange-listed
companies to implement compensation committees, which must disclose the
specific reasons behind the compensation awarded as well as the parallel between
the compensation paid and the financial performance of the company. 171
Under Delaware law, shareholders dissatisfied with executive compensation
packages may attack them on the grounds of a waste of corporate assets and an
impermissible self-dealing transaction subject to the fairness standard. 172
Corporate waste “entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so
disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person
might be willing to trade.” 173 These transfers are impermissible because they are
technically a gift. 174 If the corporation receives “any substantial consideration”
and there “is a good faith judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is
worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste, even if the fact finder would
conclude a post that the transaction was unreasonably risky.” 175 According to
Chancellor Allen, this standard is almost impossible to satisfy. 176 The Delaware
Chancery Court is “ill-fitted to attempt to weigh the ‘adequacy’ of consideration
under the waste standard or, ex post, to judge appropriate degrees of business
risk.” 177
Executive compensation may also be attacked in Delaware on the grounds
that it is an impermissible self-dealing transaction. As mentioned earlier,
executive compensation is a necessary self-interested transaction. 178 Therefore,
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self-dealing transactions are not necessarily void or voidable on this basis alone. 179
Delaware corporate law carves out a safe-harbor provision reminiscent of the
first element of the § 4958 rebuttable presumption of reasonableness standard in
the Internal Revenue Code. Under Delaware law, assuming the interested party
disclosed the material facts, a self-dealing transaction is protected if it is approved
in good faith by either disinterested directors, shareholders, or “[t]he contract or
transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or
ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the stockholders.” 180
The independence of a director is based “on whether a director is, for any
substantial reason, incapable of making a decision with only the best interests of
the corporation in mind.” 181 Although a director may not have a financial or
obvious personal interest in a transaction, courts also express concern about their
susceptibility to alternative influences. 182 For example, some “independent”
directors may still be controlled by the board. 183 A controlled director “is one who
is dominated by another party . . . .” 184 There is also a concern regarding
“structural bias” and that disinterested or independent directors “will . . . identify
with those of their fellow directors who have such a stake that their ostensibly
independent judgment will be tainted in favor of their fellows.” 185 Bias may also
be external, coming from “relatives, corporate employees, vendors, lawyers, longstanding business associates or friends, or even college or foundation officers
whose institutions have benefited.” 186 In the In re Oracle case, the court
incorporated in its independence analysis the “social nature of humans” as well as
the fact that “corporate directors are generally the sort of people deeply enmeshed
in social institutions [with] norms [and] expectations that, explicitly and implicitly,
influence and channel the behavior of those who participate . . . .” 187
Advisors hired by the board of directors must also be disinterested and
independent. 188 In Kahn v. Tremont Corp., the Supreme Court expressed a
concern about the financial advisor utilized by a special committee. 189 The advisor
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selected “had a long and personally beneficial relationship” with two of the
interested directors, worked for a bank that had a profitable business relationship
with one of the director’s related companies, and was associated with one of the
three outside directors through a connected bank. 190 The Court concluded that the
special committee failed to act independently. 191
Satisfying the Delaware safe harbor provision, however, does not always
“foreclose[] judicial review for fairness.” 192 For example in In re Wheelabrator,
despite the fact that the defendant obtained approval from disinterested directors,
the whole board, disinterested shareholders, and all shareholders, the court was not
willing to deny the plaintiff the right to make his case. 193 Rather, it shifted the
burden of proof of fairness to the plaintiffs. 194
Authorization, approval, or ratification by the board of directors is usually
achieved through an independent negotiating committee of outside directors. 195
This special committee “must be properly charged by the full board, comprised of
independent members, and vested with the resources to accomplish its task.” 196 A
special committee is responsible for negotiating the best available deal. 197 This
enables the board of directors to maintain arm’s length independence during the
transaction. 198 Though less severe, the independence requirement of this
committee is similar to the restriction in the tax regulations that members of the
authorized body approving compensation are prohibited from serving if the
benefiting party will, in the past or future, approve “a transaction providing
economic benefits to the member.” 199
The Delaware standard is not as narrow as the tax regulations with respect to
who can approve compensation, but “when directors approve in round-robin
fashion each other’s compensation while abstaining with respect to their own
under circumstances which have the aura of quid pro quo,” courts will usually
consider them self-dealing transactions. 200 Though not required by law, and
despite the apparent flaw in true independence, the use of outside directors to
approve compensation packages is widespread. 201
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Shareholder authorization, approval, or ratification of executive
compensation is far less common than authorization, approval, or ratification by
the board of directors. 202 If shareholders approve or ratify a compensation package
after it was approved in good faith by disinterested directors, the review standard
on appeal would be the almost insurmountable, corporate waste standard. 203 In
2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act became
law, allowing shareholders of publicly traded companies to cast non-binding “sayon-pay” votes on the compensation of executives. 204 The Act also requires
disclosure of golden parachute packages to shareholders when voting on certain
merger transactions. 205 While the Act is not designed to modify the fiduciary
duties of directors and officers, several “shareholder derivative actions . . . have
been filed based on negative shareholder say-on-pay votes in 2011.” 206 Regardless
of the outcome of these suits, it is clear that this legislation significantly increases
the involvement of shareholder approval and ratification of executive
compensation.
Lastly, the fairness component of Delaware § 144’s safe harbor provision
requires that interested directors “demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most
scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.” 207 According to this standard, a
fairness analysis focuses on “fair dealing” and “fair price.” 208 Although this
fairness language is absent from the Internal Revenue Code and the tax
regulations, it is reminiscent of the Code’s overall requirement of reasonableness.
The second and third elements of the rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness standard under § 4958 have specific parallels in Delaware
corporate law. The Internal Revenue Code requires that the authorized body
approving the compensation rely on appropriate data, 209 and “document the basis
for its determination.” 210 Similarly, § 144’s safe harbor provisions are conditioned
on the disclosure of all material information. 211 In addition, Delaware courts place
202
See 1-14 Delaware Corporation Law and Practice § 14.03 (shareholder involvement is most
prominent when a compensation plan involves an issuance of stock options).
203
Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 338 (Del. Ch. 1997).
204
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 STAT.
1376 (2010).
205
Id.; see also SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute Compensation as
Required Under Dodd-Frank Act, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
206
Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 25, 2011 (citations omitted).
207
Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
208
Id. at 711.
The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was
initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals
of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness
relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger,
including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects,
and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s
stock.
Id.
209
26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-6(a)(2) (2011).
210
Id. § 53.4958-6(a)(3).
211
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2010); see also In re Pure Res. S’Holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421
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emphasis on the use of outside experts and the overall process boards use when
determining compensation packages. It is necessary to “probe and consider
alternative[s]” when making decisions on behalf of a company. 212 Specifically, in
certain circumstances the Delaware courts will impose additional obligations on
directors overseeing the sale of control of a corporation. 213 When a company has
been put up for sale at auction, “the Board’s fiduciary obligations shift to obtaining
the best value reasonably available to the target’s stockholders.” 214 Delaware
courts do not impose such a stringent standard on other transactions, such as
calculating executive compensation packages, but afford a great deal of deference
to decisions based on proper process. 215
A prime example of deference is the In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litigation, where the court determined that the board did not breach its fiduciary
duty of care regarding the compensation committee’s actions. 216 This was the
court’s decision despite the fact that Michael Ovitz, the short-term president and
board member of Walt Disney, ultimately received approximately $140 million
from the company for working for approximately one year before his employment
was terminated. Disney’s board delegated the power to create and approve
compensation packages for the company’s CEO and President to the compensation
committee. 217 Defendant/appellants claimed “the record establishes that the
compensation committee members did not properly inform themselves of the
material facts and, hence, were grossly negligent in approving the [Non-Fault
Termination] provisions of [Ovitz’s employment agreement].” 218 They argued that
the process of approval was flawed because: all of the committee members did not
review a draft of the employment agreement; the minutes did not reflect a
discussion of the non-fault termination provision; the committee did not consider
alternative similar agreements; two committee members did not receive or review
certain spreadsheets; and one board member was absent from the committee
meeting. 219 The Chancellor concluded that while these failures in process were
less than what “best practices” would have entailed, the process was not so
insufficient as to warrant a breach of due care. 220 The Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed this determination. 221
The court concluded that based on the documentation in the compensation
committees possession, the committee understood that the non-fault termination

(2002) (holding that material information relevant to the decision-making process had not been fairly
disclosed to the minority shareholders).
212
In re Ft. Howard Corp. S’holders Litigation, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, at *5 (Aug. 8, 1988).
213
In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79, at *43 (May 20,
2011).
214
Id. (citing Revlon v. Maandrews and Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173,182–84 (Del. 1986)).
215
See e.g. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
216
Id. at 59. Note that “no duty of loyalty claim was asserted against the Disney defendants . . . .”
Id. at 52.
217
Id. at 53.
218
Id. at 55.
219
Id.
220
Id. at 56.
221
Id. at 60.
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payout coupled with Ovitz’s accelerated options could have such a high value after
only one year. 222 Although the minutes do not clearly reflect this understanding,
the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the Court of Chancery had enough
alternative evidence demonstrating the requisite process. 223 Other evidence
included trial testimony of witnesses regarding the spreadsheets prepared as part of
the compensation evaluation process, in addition to the valuation opinions of the
former President’s and Chief Operating Officer’s and the current Chief Executive
Officer’s compensation packages, and the valuation of the potential Ovitz options
conducted by an executive pay consultant. 224 The exempt organization tax
regulations suggest similar comparisons when approving compensation
schemes. 225
It is important to note that Delaware does not always defer to the
compensation committee, even after Disney. In Valeant Pharmaceuticals Int’l v.
Jerney, the process used by the special committee responsible for calculating
bonuses was tainted and the court concluded the “fair process” was entirely
superficial. 226 Before the evaluation process even began it was clear that “there
would be a bonus pool in the $50+ million value range.” 227 The compensation
committee was created after investors strongly criticized the proposed bonus
pool. 228 The members of the committee evaluating the transaction were all
interested parties. 229 They hired an advisor, who later told the court that he
“understood that the proposal was . . . predetermined, and that [his firm’s] job was
to find a rationale to support it.” 230 The final report omitted his initial suggestions
to decrease the value of the options awarded in the transaction. 231 This case
demonstrates that even if you have process, the presence of interested parties and
their participation in evaluating a transaction can negate any deference the courts
might otherwise afford under Delaware corporate law. Even if the parties were
disinterested, the review process undergone here would still fall short of the § 4958
requirement regarding contemporaneous documentation.
IV. REMEDIES UNDER INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS AND DELAWARE LAW
While the application of Delaware law would seldom result in recovery from
the personal assets of a director, § 4958 not only targets these personal assets, but
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situated organizations, . . . for functionally comparable positions,” “the availability of similar services in
the geographic area,” “current compensation surveys compiled by independent firms,” and “actual
written offers from similar institutions competing for the services of the disqualified person.” Id. §
53.4958-6(c)(2)(i)–(ii).
226
Valeant Pharmals. Int’l v. Jenery, 921 A.2d 732, 746 (Del. Ch. 2007).
227
Id. at 747.
228
Id.
229
Id. at 746.
230
Id. at 747.
231
Id.
223

266

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. V:II

actually forbids some forms of corporate indemnification and insurance.
Section 4958 imposes an initial tax equal to “25 percent of the excess
benefit.” 232 An additional tax of ten percent of the excess benefit will also be
imposed on any involved organizational manager, if he or she knowingly was
involved in the excess benefit transaction. 233 Knowingly participating requires the
organizational manager have actual knowledge that the transaction would confer
excess benefit and possibly violate federal tax law. 234 The manager must also
negligently fail to determine whether an actual excess benefit will result, or he or
she must actually be aware that the arrangement is an excess benefit transaction. 235
If the organizational manager’s participation was not willful and was the result of
reasonable cause, the tax will not be imposed. 236 If multiple organizational
managers were involved in the excess benefit transaction, they are all held jointly
and severally liable for the tax. 237 All of this would be radical territory for a
Delaware corporation.
Further, if the excess benefit transaction is not rectified within the taxable
period, a 200% tax is imposed on the excess benefit and must be paid by the
disqualified person. 238 The taxable period begins on the earlier of “the date of
mailing a notice of deficiency [regarding the initial tax]” 239 or “the date on which
the tax imposed . . . is assessed.” 240 In order to correct the excess benefit
transaction, it must be “undo[ne] . . . to the extent possible” and “any additional
measures necessary to place the organization in a financial position not worse than
that in which it would be if the disqualified person were dealing under the highest
fiduciary standards.” 241
To satisfy this standard, the disqualified person must make a payment in cash
or cash equivalents to the tax-exempt organization. 242 It is also possible to correct
an excess benefit transaction by returning assets to the tax-exempt organization. 243
If the excess benefit, however, was in the form of unpaid deferred compensation
the disqualified person will correct the excess benefit by “relinquishing any right to
receive the excess portion of the undistributed deferred compensation.” 244 If the
contract resulting in the excess benefit is not yet completed, the parties must
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amend its terms to prevent any excess benefit transactions in the future. 245 The
correction amount is not only the excess benefit, but interest on the excess benefit
as well. 246 The interest charge “is determined by multiplying the excess benefit by
an interest rate, compounded annually, for the period from the date the excess
benefit transaction occurred to the date of correction.” 247
It is impossible to even imagine a comparable remedy under the Delaware
corporate law framework. Not only do directors have the opportunity to retain
control of funds that are the subject of litigation, but directors may be indemnified
without security for activities which are later determined to have violated the duty
of loyalty.
As discussed above, intermediate sanctions under § 4958 were applied in
Caracci v. Commissioner. 248 The Commissioner of the IRS concluded that the
assets transferred surpassed the value of the liabilities and debts assumed by the
subchapter-S corporations by $18.5 million, resulting in an “excess benefit,” 249 and
the Commissioner imposed an excise tax on the various defendants totaling $250
million. 250 The Tax Court concluded that there was excess benefit, but reduced
amount of benefit conferred because the tax and penalties imposed were based on
inaccurate deficiency notices that the Commissioner’s own expert conceded were
“excessive, incorrect and erroneous.” 251 The Fifth Circuit overturned the Tax
Courts decision, citing improper valuation methods. 252 Both the Tax Court and the
appeal in the Fifth Circuit focused on the fair market value of the assets and
liabilities transferred to determine how much economic benefit was conferred,
rather than the punitive application of excise taxes under § 4958 itself. 253
Ultimately, practitioners were disappointed with the Carracci case because the §
4958 issues were not clearly presented. 254
While the judicial application of § 4958 intermediate sanctions has been
limited, several private letter rulings are available. In one private letter ruling, the
IRS did not find an excess benefit despite the opportunity for some indirect private
benefit. 255 In this ruling, a nonprofit organization (F), operated a short-term acute
care hospital. 256 F purchased a 10-passenger bus to be used for F’s inpatient
rehabilitation program to transport and enable patients to transition back into the
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community. 257 The surrounding area did not provide a taxi service or public
transportation. 258 When the bus is not being used by the rehabilitation program, F
planned to provide free transportation “from any adult patient’s home to the
hospital, any of its outpatient services, or to a physician office within the service
area’s communities, regardless of whether the physician is a member of F’s
medical staff.” 259 According to the facts “[n]one of the physicians benefiting from
this transportation system have a direct business relationship with F . . . [or] a
financial interest in the transportation system.” 260 The facts also indicate that three
of F’s board members are physicians, whose patients will be able to use the
transportation service. 261 The ruling reasoned that because the free transportation
service will be accessible to the surrounding medical service area and not just the
patients of F’s medical staff, the service would not constitute excess benefit by a
disqualified person under § 4958. 262 Intermediate sanctions were not warranted
despite the fact that the board member physicians and their patients could use the
bus service because it will “be equally available to all patients of all physicians in
F’s service area.” 263 The IRS concluded that “the fact that disqualified persons
may derive a benefit from the operation of the bus service to the same extent as
similarly situated members of the general public is insufficient to support a
conclusion that the operation of the bus service will confer an excess benefit on
disqualified persons.” 264 While this letter ruling provides some evidence of IRS
reasonableness, the applicant felt sufficiently concerned to undertake the process.
The willingness of individuals to pay to have a private letter ruling issued is
indicative of the level of concern of the imposition of intermediate sanctions,
whereas it is difficult to imagine that the Delaware courts would even take the time
to address such a low level benefit.
Under Delaware law, interested directors and officers of for-profit entities
are seldom found personally liable. In Delaware, corporate law affords directors
four layers of protection that insulate them from liability for violations of their
fiduciary duties. The first layer of protection is the business judgment rule, which
excuses independent and disinterested directors from “liability for corporate loss,
unless the facts are such that no person could possibly authorize such a transaction
if he or she were attempting in good faith to meet their duty.” 265 Contrast this with
the provision in § 4958 that excuses an organizational manager from intermediate
sanctions if his or her participation was not willful and was the result of reasonable
cause. 266
A second layer of protection is indemnification, permitted under § 145 of the
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Delaware Annotated Code. 267 The provision gives corporations the power to
indemnify any director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation against
expenses, judgments, fines and settlements if the person acted in “in good faith and
in a manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation.” 268 This protects directors from liability for breaches
of both the duty of care and duty of loyalty. Indemnification is not permitted if the
person is found liable to the corporation, unless the Court of Chancery determines
the director, officer, or employee deserves the indemnification. 269 If the person is
successful on the merits or otherwise, the corporation has an affirmative obligation
to indemnify them. 270 This indemnification would include the cost of attorneys’
fees, regardless of whether the director acted in good faith. 271 Further, these
attorneys’ fees and any other expenses can be paid in advance by the corporation
and later repaid if necessary. 272 As described above, indemnification is forbidden
for penalties under § 4958.
Director and officer insurance is a third mechanism for limiting the personal
liability of a Delaware director. 273 Delaware law permits a corporation to buy and
maintain an insurance policy for any liability asserted against a director, officer, or
other agent of the corporation, thus insulating directors from liability for a breach
of duty of care or loyalty. 274 This insurance may be provided irrespective of
“whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify such person
The corporation may even pay the insurance
against such liability.” 275
premium. 276 Under intermediate sanctions, the tax-exempt corporation is
forbidden from purchasing insurance to cover the excise taxes.
The final layer of protection is the liability waiver permitted under Delaware
law. Delaware’s § 102(b)(7) permits the corporate charter to limit or eliminate
personal liability for monetary damages for a breach of the duty of care by a
director. 277 This waiver, however, does not protect a director from liability for a
breach of duty of loyalty or for “acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law . . . or for any
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit.” 278 In
addition, Delaware General Corporate Law § 122(17) gives corporations the power
to
Renounce, in its certificate of incorporation or by action of its board of directors,
any interest or expectancy of the corporation in, or in being offered an opportunity
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to participate in, specified business opportunities or specified classes or categories
of business opportunities that are presented to the corporation or [one] or more of
its officers, directors or stockholders. 279

Section 4958 is quite stark in the threat of personal liability, without the
additional institutional insulation of a pro-corporate Delaware judiciary generally
unwilling to punish executives. Unlike the four layers of protection insulating
directors from liability under for-profit Delaware corporate law, the Internal
Revenue Code offers no such protections. Nonprofit corporations cannot waive or
limit personal liability, nor are they permitted to obtain insurance to protect
individuals found personally liable under § 4958.
V. CONCLUSION
Before § 4958 was added to the Internal Revenue Code, tax-exempt
organizations were harshly penalized for impermissible inurement and private
benefit. 280 With the creation of intermediate sanctions, the IRS is given the option
of imposing a penalty focused on the organization’s directors and officers instead
of the charity itself. 281 This penalty subjects individual actors committing the
wrongdoing to personal tax penalties. 282
While § 4958 and Delaware corporate law cover similar territory, they take
remarkably different paths to accomplish the same objective. By comparing the
Tax Code with Delaware corporate law it is readily apparent that, despite the
similarities, § 4958 is far more restrictive.
It is arguable that, unlike the IRS and the Tax Court, Delaware common law
is shaped by institutional bias. According to both scholars and practitioners,
“corporate law . . . is created by a process of competition between the states, [with]
[e]ach state ha[ving] an incentive to entice out-of-state corporations to incorporate
under its law because it derives tax revenue from the corporation.” 283 Delaware’s
small size, central location and limited countervailing interests create the necessary
conditions to develop favorable corporate laws. 284 Over time, Delaware has
become very dependent on the revenue derived from corporate taxation. 285
Authorities speculate, “should any other state find an attractive corporate law
innovation, Delaware will match if not better it.” 286 Alternatively, the grasp of the
IRS spans across the country. Nonprofit entities have no choice of venue in which
to escape the Internal Revenue Code. While it is arguable the harsh personal
liabilities under § 4958 might deter individuals from working for nonprofits, there
is no supporting empirical data. Therefore, the IRS has no incentive to create less
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restrictive laws governing unreasonable nonprofit executive compensation.
A more overt justification for the heightened tax regulations is that
nonprofits lack the same external governance that Delaware law affords. 287 The
actions of directors, officers, and employees of for-profit corporations are
monitored by shareholders who have a financial interest in the corporation. 288
When corporate management engages in wrongdoing, shareholders may bring
direct and derivative actions against them. 289 Specifically, a derivate claim for
excess compensation requires a plaintiff demonstrate that “the board or relevant
committee that awarded the compensation lacked independence” or that “the
board, while independent, nevertheless lacked good faith in making the award.” 290
Derivative actions are not available in the context of nonprofit entities because
there are no shareholders. Further, the nonprofit counterpart to shareholders are
donors who have no direct financial incentive to monitor against self-dealing. If a
donor feels their charitable donation is not being used to further the charitable
purpose of the organization, he or she simply can stop making contributions. 291
Though the IRS monitors nonprofits through audits and Form 990, there is
arguably no greater motivator than one’s own financial well-being. Monitoring by
shareholders with vested interests in for-profit companies will likely be more
successful than monitoring solely to prevent abuse or wrongdoing in nonprofit
organizations. In the absence of shareholders, federal law imposes a much stricter
liability regime policing the duty of loyalty. The deterrents must be stronger and
the rules tougher when the agents lack principals.
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